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Against Individualized Consideration
CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ*
INTRODUCTION
Are Cubans Hispanic? According to trial testimony cited by Justice Kennedy in his
dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger, at least one University of Michigan Law School
admissions officer concluded that they were not-at least for the purposes of the
school's affirmative action policy. Cubans, as everyone knows, are Republicans.'
Whether this hearsay was accurate, evidence of admissions officers attempting to
define Hispanic was present in several places in the Grutter record. Other trial
documents revealed that the admissions preference given to Hispanics extended to
Puerto Ricans born on the United States mainland, but not to those born on the island
itself.2 The University of Michigan Law School's admissions bulletin also singled out
Mexican Americans as requiring "special attention" in the admissions process, despite
the formal policy's reference to Hispanics generally. 3 Opponents of the University of
Michigan Law School's affirmative action policy cited these distinctions to underscore
the race-conscious bankruptcy of the school's policy, emphasizing the district court's
finding that "there is no logical basis" for the school's choice of the "particular racial
groups which receive special attention" from the admissions office.4
When all was said and done, however, this evidence of Latino parsing failed to
make a negative impression on the Court. Indeed, the Court may have upheld the
Michigan plan because of such evidence. The Hispanic hierarchy created by the
University of Michigan Law School was an inevitable product of the very mechanism
that saved the policy-individualized consideration.5 In Gratz v. Bollinger, the
companion case to Grutter, the Court eschewed the mechanical points system adopted
by the University's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts, according to which
members of certain racial groups, namely African Americans, Hispanics, and Native
Americans, were assigned twenty points (out of a possible total of 150) just by virtue
of their race or ethnicity.6 The Court in Gratz concluded that such automatic
assignations transformed race from a mere plus factor to a decisive factor "for virtually
every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant.",
7
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1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 393 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
2. See Brief for the Petitioner at 43, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-
241), available at http://www.cir-usa.orglegal-docslgrutter_ v-bollingerSupCt-bief.pdf.
3. Id. at 47.
4. See id. at 43. I explore the logical basis for these distinctions infra Part III.
5. The Court cited heavily to Justice Powell's opinion in University of California Regents
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315-20 (1978), in which he emphasized use of race as a mere "plus"
factor, or one among many factors in an applicant's file, as essential to a constitutional
affirmative action plan.
6. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 255 (2003).
7. Id. at 272.
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The narrow tailoring component of the Michigan affirmative action cases presented
the Court with a classic choice, between rules and standards. The Court chose the
standards, demanding that the weight assigned to an applicant's race as part of an
affirmative action policy vary according to admissions officers' judgments based on
8the entirety of each individual applicant's record. This method of consideration is
required to ensure that every applicant is treated as an individual and not merely as a
member of a race-the risk presented by race-conscious decision making that the
Court has sought to avoid by imposing strict scrutiny on all racial classifications,
whether benign or invidious.
9
In my contribution to this symposium, Latinos and Latinas at the Epicenter ofLegal
Discourse, I argue that the Court got its narrow tailoring analysis backwards, and that
the story of the excluded Cuban Republicans suggests why. The ultimate effect of
individualized consideration is to augment rather than limit the harms of race-
conscious decision making by the state, because individualized consideration gives
state actors the power to make authenticity judgments concerning the identities of both
individuals and groups, subsequently creating incentives for groups to define
themselves using authenticity as a metric. When it comes to taking race into account to
achieve compelling state objectives-a practice I accept but whose defense is beyond
the scope of this Article-rules rather than standards should be the order of the day.
Assigning applicants a twenty-point bonus based on race or ethnicity may appear
unseemly at first glance, particularly in contrast to a policy that permits race-based
distinctions to take place behind closed doors. But individualized consideration is
ultimately more likely to thwart the long-term objectives of reducing the salience of
race in our society and eliminating race-based stereotyping. Individualized
consideration demands that officials prioritize among members of a racial group
according to race-related criteria, whereas mechanical decision making simply
demands recognition of the existence of broad categories and the membership of
certain individuals in those categories, based on individual self-identification.
Standards like individualized consideration give state officials power to define the
content of a racial category, and it is that process of definition, not the taking of race
into account in and of itself, that undermines the integrity of the individual, the
8. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336-37 (discussing the "holistic, individualized" review given
to each applicant by the University of Michigan Law School, according to which race is
considered alongside a wide range of other variables).
9. For a discussion of the Court's use of individualized consideration over time and an
argument that the Court has made such consideration the touchstone of narrow tailoring analysis
in order to avoid balkanization, or inter-group tensions, see Neil S. Siegel, Race-Conscious
Student Assignment Plans: Balkanization, Integration, and Individualized Consideration, 56
DuKE L.J. 781 (2006). Siegel notes that the Court struck down the college admissions plan in
Gratz v. Bollinger because it gave a clearly identifiable weight to race-a policy likely to lead
to resentment from other groups--but upheld the law school plan because the use of race was
camouflaged from the public, which meant that any resentment the plan engendered was likely
outweighed by the balkanization that would have resulted from prohibiting the state from taking
account of race to address inequalities. See id. at 798-99; see also Robert C. Post, Foreword:
Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARv. L. REv. 4, 56-77
(2003) (noting that the distinction between the two plans underscores that appearances do
matter, and that the Court stuck a balance between constitutional law and culture in a way that
legitimized the concerns of both sides of the dispute).
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protection of which is the supposed rationale for the pursuit of colorblindness and the
Court's consequent deep skepticism of race-conscious decision making.
In the course of defending this proposition in the narrow context of affirmative
action in education, I hope to make a broader point about the importance of
conceptualizing the category of Latino expansively in public discourse, as well as in
other legal contexts, such as the voting rights arena. There is a specific concept of
individualized consideration particular to the affirmative action debate, but there is also
a related and more general question about how specific or individuated the concept of
Latino should be. Exploring the downsides of individualized consideration in one
context can help build an argument in favor of broad-brush definitions in others. To
put it simply, because I believe authenticity claims to be polarizing and antagonistic to
a civil rights agenda that simultaneously rejects colorblindness but seeks Latino
assimilation into a mainstream political culture, I believe it is essential, when defining
Latino, to be inclusive along lines of race, class, national origin, citizenship status, and
linguistic identification. There are plenty of arguments against a capacious definition
of Latino, including that it distracts attention from the core civil rights concern of
combating subordination and makes intra-group solidarity harder to promote, in part
because a diffuse category becomes a less meaningful and cohesive category. But I
hope that the upside of the argument for a broad definition-namely that it destabilizes
the concepts of race and ethnicity ' 0 without denying that those concepts are relevant to
social life and status-will be sufficient to carry the day.
I elaborate these conclusions in three parts. First, I define what I mean by
authenticity claims and explain why individualized consideration does more harm than
good. Second, I discuss why the mechanical consideration of race actually advances
the process of putting race into its proper perspective. Third, I acknowledge that
individualized consideration may be more effective than mechanical programs at
producing race-conscious policies that combat subordination and discrimination. By
permitting admissions officers to draw distinctions among individual Latino applicants,
or among different "types" of Latinos, individualized consideration enables decision
makers to more accurately identify the sort of Latino who needs or deserves the
protection of the civil rights agenda. But I conclude by arguing that the broad,
undifferentiated use of racial classifications better balances the interest in ensuring the
representation of disadvantaged or subordinated minority groups in public institutions
and the political process with the imperative of keeping the definition of race fluid. As
I will explain, realizing this balance by ensuring that the value of fluidity be given
adequate weight is of considerable importance to Latinos. And the possibility of
achieving balance represents the ultimate benefit of the diversity rationale as a
governance framework for a multi-ethnic society, where race is recognized to exist but
is understood to be plural.
I. THE PROBLEM WI- INDIVIDUATION
I assume for the sake of argument that we as a society will continue to maintain and
rely on racial classifications in various ways: in affirmative action programs, in the
10. For the purposes of this short Artice, I use the terms race and ethnicity interchangeably,
unless specifically noted otherwise.
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voting rights arena, in enforcing the civil rights laws, and in public discourse about
equality. In each of these contexts, it must be determined who counts as a member of
the groups given protection or benefits, or over whose welfare we should be
concerned. Among the questions that must be answered is what role the state (and, by
extension, lawmakers, lawyers, and participants in public discourse) should play in
defining the scope of the group classifications at issue.
In the context of affirmative action, the Supreme Court has made clear that the
state's judgments on this score should be nuanced. Individualized consideration has
become the defining feature of a narrowly tailored affirmative action policy. In Grutter
v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court leaned heavily on Justice Powell's previous elevation
of the decision-making framework, emphasizing that he made clear in his opinion in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke' that "truly individualized
consideration demands that race be used in a flexible, nonmechanical way."'12 The
Grutter Court underscored that when using race as a "plus" factor in university
admissions, a program "must remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is
evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant's race or ethnicity
the defining feature of his or her application."' 13 In their evaluation of the student
assignment plans adopted by Seattle and Louisville in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,14 various Justices 15 underscored the tight
connection between permissible race-conscious decision making and individualized
consideration. 16 In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy concluded that the school
assignment plans could not be considered valid on the basis of Grutter and Gratz,
emphasizing that the plans 17 represented an even cruder version of the point system
struck down in Gratz, rather than a system that would permit students to be considered
based on a "whole range of their talents and school needs with race as just one
consideration," such as the plan upheld in Grutter. 18
11. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
12. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
13. Id. at 337.
14. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
15. The statements in Parents Involved that emphasized individualized consideration came
from Justices who either were in dissent in Grutter (Kennedy) or were not on the Court when
Grutter was decided (Roberts).
16. In his plurality opinion, Chief Justice Roberts observed that the Court in Grutter "was
exceedingly careful in describing the interest... as 'not an interest in simple ethnic diversity'..
• but rather a 'far broader array of qualifications and characteristics' in which race was but a
single element." Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2763. He also emphasized that the Seattle and
Louisville plans, which classify "every schoolchild as black or white" and use that
"classification as a determinative factor in assigning children to achieve pure racial balance,"
could be regarded as less burdensome than the individualized consideration upheld in Grutter,
in which the Court emphasized the "importance of individualized consideration" as
"paramount," and upheld a plan in which "race was one factor in a highly individualized,
holistic review." Id. at 1264.
17. The plans adopted in Seattle and Louisville differed in their details, but they each took
account of the race of students, along with sibling attendance and geography, to ensure that the
student populations of the districts' schools remained racially integrated. See Parents Involved,
127 S. Ct. at 2746-50.
18. Id. at 2794 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy noted that if Gratz were the
1408 [Vol. 83:1405
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Contrary to this conventional wisdom, however, it is crude, mechanical decision
making that ultimately restrains the state in its race consciousness. In his concurrence
in Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy explained his aversion to race-consciousness by
emphasizing that when the government "classifies an individual by race, it must first
define what it means to be of a race."'19 Though this characterization may sound
ominous, it is an overstatement that ultimately proves my point about individualized
consideration. If we accept the need to maintain racial categories for certain purposes,
then the need for the government to identify those categories in the abstract (for
example, white, black, Hispanic, Asian) is inescapable. But it is by no means a
necessary component of race-conscious decision making that the state also be the one
to define what it means to be of these groups, or to determine who can claim
membership in them. It is individualized consideration-the mechanism preferred by
the Court as the means of reducing the weight given to race-that gives the state this
power to define who and what counts as representative of a race. By contrast,
mechanical interpretation leaves the power of definition to the individual-a claim I
explore in Part II.
In permitting admissions officers to consider race as a mere plus factor,
individualized consideration does not restrain their race-based judgments-it unleashes
them. Individualized consideration gives state actors the power not just to notice race,
as mechanical interpretation does, but also to define race, on a case-by-case basis. This
power means that race will be treated as more relevant to some applicants than to
others. This power is not simply the authority to decide when race will be decisive in a
particular case; it is also the power to decide under what circumstances someone's race
will yield a contribution to the student body worth noting or valuing. As the probably
off-hand comment by the admissions officer wondering whether to count Cubans as
Hispanics demonstrates, the individualized decision-making mechanism allows
individuals in positions of power to determine who the authentic members of a group
are, and, thus, to articulate the contours of that group.
For two significant reasons, we should be wary of giving the state or its officials in
decision-making positions this kind of power to determine authenticity and value.
20
measure for judging, the plans in Seattle and Louisville would be afortiori invalid, because the
Gratz plan placed much less emphasis on race. Id. Indeed, the college admissions plan at issue
in Gratz, despite being mechanical in nature, took into account many more factors than the
Seattle and Louisville plans, assigning points to applicants for their academic, artistic, athletic,
and socioeconomic backgrounds, among other things, in addition to their racial and ethnic
backgrounds. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 293-94 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting).
19. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2796 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
20. This criticism of individualized consideration is similar to Justice Thomas's critique of
affirmative action generally. In his concurrence and dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306,349-50 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), as in his concurrence
in the school desegregation case Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114-22 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring), Thomas assails affirmative action and race-conscious decision making for the ways
in which it permits the majority to patronize blacks for the majority's own ends. When he
deploys Frederick Douglass's admonition to whites to let blacks rise and fall on their own
merits, Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349-50, Thomas is arguing against the attempt to mold blacks in the
white image, calling on whites to retire their assumptions that blacks can only succeed with the
help and in the presence of whites. The force of this critique informs my opposition to
individualized consideration. I part company with Justice Thomas, however, in believing that
this critique does not require us to jettison race-conscious decision making in the educational
2008] 1409
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The first reason is that such power creates a stereotyping danger. By permitting
admissions officers to decide "who counts," individualized consideration opens the
door to stereotypical decision making, because it gives admissions officers the power
to determine which applicants' races or ethnicities will contribute to the representation
of those races or ethnicities. 21 The ways in which non-Latinos (who probably make up
the majority of university admissions officers) define Latino are more likely to be beset
by expectations that particular narratives be present in the life of the applicant.
Admissions officers may, for example, look for a narrative of discrimination and
disadvantage, re-enforcing the social tendency to see Latinos through one lens-as
those who have overcome obstacles, experienced poverty, come from uneducated
stock, or speak accented English.22 Or, perhaps they believe that the Latino most likely
to contribute is one who speaks Spanish, or can recount a harrowing family experience
of escape from persecution. Or perhaps admissions officers will feel they have fulfilled
their responsibility by admitting wealthy Latin Americans, rather than American
Latinos, or white advantaged Latinos regardless of their connection to Latino culture,
thus failing to include Latinos from across the socioeconomic and racial spectrum.
23
Though these selection biases are likely to emerge when state actors are permitted
to pick and choose among members of any group, they are notoriously fraught in the
Latino context. 24 Latinos do not share the same race, national origin, history, linguistic
affiliations, or economic status, and intra-group solidarity thus can be hard to come
context. But I do believe that the way in which that decision making is conducted can contribute
to affirmative action's demeaning of the very groups it purports to benefit.
21. Cf Kevin R. Johnson, Comparative Racialization: Culture and National Origin in the
Latinalo Communities, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 633 (2001) (analyzing how the popularity of Latin
music and the Elian Gonzalez case highlight the ways in which Latino groups become racialized
and stereotyped).
22. Cf ROBERTO SURO, CHANGING CHANNELS AND CRISSCROSSING CULTURE: A SURVEY OF
LATINOS ON THE NEWS MEDIA 2 (2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/27.pdf
(reporting that representations of Latinos in Spanish-language media are generally more positive
than in the mainstream, English-language press).
23. Defining "Latino" to include a wide array of experiences is a delicate enterprise. While
I believe Latinos as a group have an interest in defining themselves as more than victims of race
discrimination, I also do not want to discount the experience of discrimination or elide the ways
in which "Latino" has been socially constructed as a race, or express overinvestment in the fact
that there is such a thing as a "white" Latino, or an advantaged Latino.
24. For scholarly commentary on the subject, see, Berta Esperanza Hernndez Truyol,
Building Bridges-Latinas and Latinos at the Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric, and
Replacement, 25 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 369 (1994) (highlighting the varied demographics
and histories of Latino subgroups); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Latino Identity, 19
CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 197 (1998) (exploring tensions between native-born and immigrant
Latino groups); Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1994) (illustrating the fluidity
of Latino identity and the challenges with respect to Latino self-identification in an American
context focused on the black-white paradigm). Cf Ian F. Haney L6pez, Race, Ethnicity,
Erasure: The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 57 (1998) (arguing that
Latinos should be considered a race, because race is socially constructed and the Latino
experience in the United States has been characterized by racialization and discrimination); Juan
F. Perea, Buscando Am~rica: Why Integration and Equal Protection Fail to Protect Latinos,
117 HARv. L. REv. 1420, 1425 (2004) (noting that the Spanish language is at the heart of the
Latino experience in the United States).
1410 [Vol. 83:1405
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by.25 In other words, identifying "representative" Latinos will necessitate either
stereotypical thinking or prioritization of characteristics-a process that threatens to
"fix" racial identity in place while excluding important dimensions of the Latino
experience from the definition of the category.
In making this point, I do not mean to suggest that definitional statements cannot be
made about Latinos, or to claim that the category is incoherent and therefore irrelevant
in civil rights debates. Universities, lawmakers, civil rights leaders, advertisers, and
research centers all assume "Hispanics" exist. Rejecting the category altogether seems
unnecessary-why cut off the nose to spite the face? But the substitution of specific
national origin categories for the general grouping would be difficult to administer,2
6
divisive, and increasingly less relevant (and based on difficult to defend inheritance
theories of race) as the generations become removed from the immigrant experience.
Accepting that the category Latino exists, then, my ultimate aim is to underscore
that the possibility of stereotyping is introduced when admissions officers are given the
power to treat race as a substantive concept, rather than as a mere demographic fact,
particularly when the racial grouping is a sprawling one. By giving state actors the
power to consider how race relates to particular individuals and their potential
contributions, we encourage the development of semi-official definitions of the
category-the very sorts of definitions that produce stereotypical thinking and deny
that the experience of race or ethnicity differs from individual to individual.2 7 In other
words, individualized consideration promotes a substantive race-consciousness that
makes the state a direct participant in the elaboration of the meaning of race, rather
than keeping the state as a mere observer, recorder, and perhaps facilitator of that
process.
The second danger presented by the individualized model is what I like to call the
personal essay problem: individualized consideration demands that people perform
their ethnicity for admissions officers, either through their personal statements or in
entrance interviews. These performances help shape the ways minorities see
themselves and their role in the United States. Such forms of self-expression through
an emphasis on one's heredity, family, or racially-determined life experiences are by
25. I have elaborated on why I believe the Latino category to be a complex but meaningful
one, despite these definitional difficulties, in other contexts. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodriguez,
From Litigation, Legislation, 117 YALE L.J. 101, 136-138 (2008) (discussing "Latino" as a
meaningful associational group in the voting rights context); Cristina M. Rodriguez, Latinos and
Immigrants, 11 HARv. LATINO L. REV. 501, 509-13 (2008).
26. Cf Paul Brest& Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Actionfor Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 855,
888-90 (1995) (arguing that there is little inter-group definition among Latinos and emphasizing
that the decision about which Latino sub-groups to include in an affirmative action policy
should depend on a given law school's rationale for its affirmative action program).
27. In her work on affirmative action, Lani Guinier expresses a preference for Justice
Ginsburg's dissent in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting),
which asserts that a transparent numbers-based system helps avoid dangers, such as the
stereotyping of blacks in the name of affirmative action, that are endemic to an individualized
consideration model. She also emphasizes that the individualized consideration model gives
admissions officers the power to act as gatekeepers for a small elite, making judgments about
minority applicants that reflect conscious and subconscious biases. Lani Guinier, Admissions
Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV.
113, 182-92 (2003).
2008] 1411
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no means illegitimate, and most, if not all, are likely sincere. But individualized forms
of consideration give minority applicants powerful incentives to play to the script the
dominant culture has written for its minorities. This script may encourage the telling of
the immigrant narrative, the discrimination narrative, or the inter-generational culture
clash narrative, 28 each of which requires Latinos to put their identities in a political
frame, as opposed to allowing Latinos simply to live their identities. This demand to
experience one's identity can be exhausting for the ethnic minority, and it is in tension
with the long-term goal of reducing self-consciousness of race.
This personal essay dilemma is related to what Kenji Yoshino has described as the
problem of "reverse covering," or the pressure an individual feels to behave in ways
that conform to and signal how that individual's group is (stereotypically) different
from the dominant culture. 29 My concern for the incentives the dilemma creates, like
my concern for the stereotyping problem, also reflects anxiety about the possibility of
group essentialization, or the fear that giving race substantive, cultural content is a way
of freezing the definition of that identity in place and time, or declaring that it contains
universal characteristics, or certain parameters within which anyone who truly belongs
must fall. 30 Incentives to behave according to certain race-based expectations
compromise the autonomy of the individual by inhibiting her capacity to self-define;
they may even pressure her to identify with particular groups or ways of behaving that
she might not freely choose absent the social expectations that prompt the behavior or
identification. As a result, both from the perspective of the Court's long-term goal of
reducing race consciousness and given what I consider to be the long-term objectives
of the affirmative action and civil rights agendas--the incorporation of minorities such
as Latinos into mainstream political culture and important social and political
institutions on their own terms-individualized consideration can be
counterproductive.
The ideas that racial or ethnic categories exist, have cultural content, and should be
taken into account when considering whether our institutions and political processes
are sufficiently inclusive need not be rejected to avoid the personal essay problem.
Instead, my primary claim is that the content of terms like Hispanic should be defined
primarily by those who might bear that designation, in dialogue with other members of
the group and the general culture, and not by the state. Facilitating this sort of
definitional process driven by minorities and individuals means not only that state
actors should not have the power to distinguish among types of Latinos, but also that
Latinos as a group must support the broad definition of the parameters of the category,
28. Cf RiCHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD 251-52 (2008) ("Admissions officers
noticed a minor literary genre of 'cooking smells' essays, in which the applicant waxed
nostalgic about the evocative aroma of a distant relative's ethnic cuisine. Students of every color
and hue described their diverse backgrounds and experiences.").
29. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, Ill YALE L.J. 769, 910 (2002). Yoshino observes that
women are more likely to be expected to reverse cover than non-whites and gays, because
stereotypically feminine traits are "more likely to be valued as appropriate to at least some
spheres of life." Id.
30. Cf RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CuLTuRE: A CRmQUE (2005) (arguing that civil
rights protections should be focused on race discrimination, not discrimination on the basis of
possession of cultural traits); CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 21-32 (2001) (discussing the
problems with assessing race through an authenticity lens).
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even as they may experience and make sense of their own Hispanicity or Latinidad in
highly specific, individualized terms. Latinos may define first and foremost as Puerto
Ricans or Cubans, and they may have wildly divergent experiences as Latinos in the
United States, but acknowledging this specificity is not inconsistent with recognizing a
capacious definition of the terms Hispanic and Latino for the purposes of social and
political discourse. I discuss the benefits of this approach and the compatibility of
mechanical rules with its objectives in the next Part.
II. IN DEFENSE OF THE MECHANICAL
If individualized consideration represents a form of race consciousness that gives
state actors the wrong kind of power, what might be the alternative? Contrary to the
conventional wisdom that has solidified in Supreme Court jurisprudence, numerically
based, mechanical schemes constrain the state in its use of race. Such schemes
authorize the state to assign only pre-determined values to applicants' racial and ethnic
identities, not to explore their relative values on case-by-case bases. There are at least
three key benefits of this sort of approach.
The most obvious defense of mechanical interpretation was offered by Justice
Ginsburg in her dissenting opinion in Gratz v. Bollinger-the benefit of
transparency. 31 She chides the Court for preferring the "winks" and "nods ' 32 inherent
in the amorphous standards of individualized consideration to the transparency that is
emblematic of mechanical, rule-based formulae. Under an individualized model, it is
impossible for anyone outside an admissions committee to determine how much
weight is being given to race generally, or to particular racial subgroups, but under a
mechanical scheme, the state actor pre-commits to a particular weight and applies it
evenly across the board.33 In other words, the mechanical state is more forthright about
its use of race than the individualized state, thus quelling potential conspiracy theories
about corrupt racial spoils systems and enabling the public to hold the state
accountable when it believes the weight being given to race is either too great or too
little. 34
31. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298-305 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 305.
33. Cf Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don't Tell, Don 'tAsk: Narrow TailoringAfter Grutter
and Gratz, 85 TEx. L. REv. 517, 559 (2007) (concluding that the law school admissions scheme
gave more weight to race than did the undergraduate admissions program and emphasizing that
in upholding the law school plan despite evidence that it differentiated among applicants more
than the undergraduate plan, the Court was expressing something of an aesthetic preference
against overt quantification).
34. The Court in Grutter may well have approved of individualized consideration precisely
because of its black box quality-because it enables the state to conceal its use of race---either
for appearances sake or in an attempt to tamp down the majority's resentment of affirmative
action. But the very existence of an affirmative action policy, regardless of its execution, is
likely sufficient to generate the sort of majority opposition that leads to litigation and efforts to
stop affirmative action by referendum. Indeed, even in the wake of the Grutter/Gratz
compromise, voters in Michigan approved the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative, which
essentially banned affirmative action, despite Grutter having left the state with the authority to
do no more than engage in individualized consideration. In other words, the costs of
individualized consideration described in Part I are unlikely to be offset by the supposed benefit
20081 1413
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Second, and more importantly, mechanical decision making ensures that the precise
use of race is triggered by the individual's self-identification, rather than the judgments
of the admissions officer. In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy laments that the danger
of racial classifications in general, and crude mechanical applications in particular, is
that individuals are "forced to live under a state-mandated racial label," which is
"inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society," because it assigns labels
"that an individual is powerless to change." 35 But this conclusion is classic Kennedy
overstatement that fails accurately to describe mechanical affirmative action policies.
To be sure, in adopting them, the decision maker has made a judgment that certain
groups require special attention, or extra "points," to ensure their inclusion in a given
institution. But whether we are talking about the admissions context, where the
individual is invited to specify race on his or her application, or the voting rights
context, where population is determined through responses to the Census, decision
making based on thefact of someone's racial identity can easily be constructed to take
its cues from how individuals choose to categorize themselves.
Under a mechanical scheme, race becomes relevant to an admissions decision
because it is a fact that the individual has acknowledged about him or herself, not a
characteristic whose meaning to the individual the state has discerned, or the
admissions officer has determined is likely to contribute to the education of others. The
assignation of points has a limited dignitary impact on the individual when seen from
this perspective, because it simply amounts to recognition of membership in a group,
or a demographic fact. What is arguably demeaning is the conclusion that Latinos or
blacks require preferences at all to succeed. But once we accept this premise, it is
difficult to see how being recognized as Latino by the state, when one has identified
herself as such, demeans the individual, or forces her into an identity box she would
rather avoid. 36
It is, of course, possible to find the very act of recognizing racial differences
abhorrent, even when the act is responsive to self-identification. In 2000, for example,
a district court in South Texas heard a constitutional challenge to the Census
requirement that individuals classify themselves on the basis of race or ethnicity. 37 The
plaintiffs in the suit claimed that Congress had failed to articulate a compelling
justification for the racial classifications imposed by the Census38 and contended that
such self-classification "can do nothing to propel this country toward a society in
which race and ethnicity do not matter."39 Being forced to self-classify on the basis of
race or ethnicity, they argued, deprived them of their ability to describe themselves
of obfuscation.
35. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,2797 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
36. Recognizing this point does not preclude also acknowledging that the specific point
value given to race might itself have demeaning effects if the point value is considerable, or
appears excessive. Those designing mechanical points system should be attentive to these sorts
of concerns, which the Court in Gratz seemed to be flagging by criticizing the twenty points
assigned on the basis of race as inflexible, out of proportion to point values assigned for other
attributes, and decisive in most cases. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 272. 1 discuss this issue infra notes
42-43 and accompanying text.
37. See Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
38. Id.at810-11.
39. Id. at 814.
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simply as Americans. 40 The court found, however, that the requirement of self-
classification does not violate the Fifth Amendment, suggesting that state data
gathering on the basis of race for the basic purpose of acquiring the information
necessary to govern is fundamentally different from state use of suspect classifications
without a compelling interest. 41 Though the court did not say so explicitly, the fact that
the classifications were not imposed by the state seemed to make the application of
strict scrutiny inapposite.
Unlike the Census, of course, requests for self-classification in the affirmative
action context are for more than information-gathering purposes; they lead directly to
the state assigning benefits and burdens on the basis of race. But as in the Census
context, the classifications the state uses under a mechanical affirmative action plan
arise from the guidance and with the imprimatur of the person in question, which at
least guards against the danger of the state forcing an identity on the individual. And
when compared to individualized consideration programs, the state's removal from the
process of classification becomes all the more apparent. The kind of assignation of
racial groupings that occurs under mechanical affirmative action programs is ultimately
not much different from the sorts of race-conscious policies Justice Kennedy approved
in his concurrence in Parents Involved, such as race-conscious school siting or district-
drawing decisions. In the admissions context, the mechanical classification of people
into racial and ethnic groups does operate more directly on the individual, to be sure.
But the act of classification in each instance, because it is based on the noting of a
demographic fact, is not terribly different.
Finally, as the dissenters in Gratz point out, mechanical schemes can be designed
to treat race as one of many factors in an individual's application, and the weight given
to race can be adjusted to balance the need to ensure its utility in securing the
admission of minorities with the expectation that applicants will be considered for the
totality of their talents.42 But not only does the mechanical version of this process have
the advantage of restraining the state from assigning value to the content or substance
of race, it also ensures that all members of a given racial grouping are treated equally.
In this sense, mechanical interpretation is substantially less race-conscious than
individualized consideration. While points schemes, precisely because of their
transparency, may contribute to white/non-white tensions more than an individualized
consideration regime under which neither the precise weight given to race nor the
extent of the preference across individuals can be discerned, a mechanical scheme is
less likely to contribute to intra-group resentment and competition.
This insight is of particular importance to Latinos. The perception that certain
Latinos are valued or counted more than others can give rise to petty grievances,
competition, and racism. The point is not necessarily that Latinos should consider
themselves all to be locked in common cause. Rather, the importance of treating all
Latinos as equally Latino stems from the fact that neither the Latino population nor the
40. Id. at 815.
41. Id. at 814.
42. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 529 U.S. 244, 293-97 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The
college simply does by a numbered scale what the law school accomplishes in its 'holistic
review,' ... the distinction does not imply that applicants to the undergraduate college are
denied individualized consideration or a fair chance to compete on the basis of all the various
merits their applications may disclose.") (citations omitted).
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objective of producing a functional, plural society is served when the state appears to
prefer certain Latinos over others, for whatever reason. If the state is perceived to
prefer as representative of Latino identity the poor or the affluent; the fully assimilated
or the bicultural; the white, brown, or black Latino; or the Mexican, Puerto Rican, or
Cuban, then it is participating in the sort of identity definition that leads to
stereotyping, resentment, and alienation of those groups not considered to qualify for
membership or recognition. The perception of intra-group competition pushes Latinos
to distinguish themselves from one another, not for the sake of specificity or asserting
one's particular heritage, but for the sake of claiming a benefit, or denying the
authenticity of another Latino subgroup.
In emphasizing the virtues of mechanical interpretation, I certainly recognize its
limitations. First, I acknowledge that the twenty points assigned on the basis of race to
applicants under the scheme in Gratz-a point total that eclipsed what could be
assigned for the personal essay or musical talents (five points), but that was equal to
the points given to athletes and persons from socioeconomically disadvantaged
backgrounds 43-- could appear stark, excessive, and therefore demeaning. In my view,
the primary argument against mechanical interpretation is that it does not permit
individual minority students to avoid the "taint" of affirmative action. The major
benefit of individualized consideration is that it gives the individual minority (though
not minorities as a group) plausible deniability, or the ability to conclude that he or she
as an individual was admitted without the benefit of a racial preference. This advantage
may well help reduce the stigmatizing effects of affirmative action, not only because
the individual minority is freed from feeling that she would not have been admitted but
for her race, but also because it helps prevent the population as a whole from assuming
that all minorities have achieved what they have due to preferences.
Second, rejecting individualized consideration would not necessarily put an end to
Latino parsing by the state. 44 An affirmative action policy could explicitly call for
special attention to Mexican Americans, for example, as the University of Texas policy
struck down by the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood v. Texas45did.
But on the first score, I am skeptical that individualized consideration has any
meaningful effect on the general population's perceptions of minorities in a world with
affirmative action, or that permitting an admissions office to obfuscate its precise use
of race actually diminishes the resentment affirmative action engenders (Barbara
Grutter did bring suit, after all). 46 The core of the critique of Gratz-like programs is not
so much an indictment of mechanical interpretation itself, but of the way in which the
mechanical scheme is constructed.
43. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 279 (O'Connor, I., concurring).
44. The most obvious instance in which Latino parsing continues to occur is in the Census,
which permits individuals and families to define their races and ethnicities with ever-greater
specificity. My claims in this Article about broad definition of racial groupings are not meant to
suggest that this trend is misguided. To the contrary, for information-gathering purposes, as well
as out of respect for those who participate in the Census, it is important to develop as clear a
sense as possible of how our demography breaks down and how large, socially salient groups
break down internally along lines of race, national origin, income, language ability, etc.
45. 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996).
46. See supra note 34 for further discussion of this point.
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And with respect to the second concern, for the same reasons that individualized
consideration presents problems that have not been fully appreciated by the Court or
commentators, it is vital that decision makers constructing mechanical schemes avoid
introducing the nuances that might otherwise arise in an individualized decision when
determining the racial categories to be taken into account. School admissions policies,
whether at the primary or university level, are part of the process of defining our
democratic society's demographic profile, or of constructing the sort of plural
community we believe should be represented in our institutions.47 In other words,
school admissions officers do not just define Latino for the sake of admissions; they
socially construct the category. Not only might we want schools to represent the
broader society in micro form, but the broad and equal distribution of educational
opportunities is essential to future equal participation. Because of the social
construction that admissions policies and other race-conscious decision making
represent, I believe it is crucial that the definitions of ethnic groups, to the extent that
we maintain them, be broad. It is unnecessarily divisive for the state to declare certain
subgroups socially salient and others not.48
At the end of the day, the Court's elaboration of the individualized consideration
model does little to advance a more general theory of how the state should engage in
race-conscious decision making. Individualized consideration is simply not an
available mechanism for most any other context in which race and ethnicity present
representational, participatory, or distributional concerns. Despite Justice Kennedy's
invocation of the concept in Parents Involved, numerous commentators have pointed
out that the technique has little relevance or utility in the context of assigning students
in elementary or secondary schools, where "merit" has yet to become a meaningful
concept. 49 In the other context in which race-conscious decision making is still clearly
permitted-the voting rights arena-individualized consideration means even less,
because the concerns are necessarily those of group power.
50
47. See Guinier, supra note 27, at 135 (discussing how the task of constituting a class is a
political act, because it implicates the institution's sense of itself as a community, as well as the
larger society's sense of itself as a democracy, in the context of exploring how colleges have
evolved from being elite, exclusionary institutions to being engines of economic and social
mobility).
48. Similar claims can be made for our understanding of what the category "Asian" means,
or "African American" for that matter. In the former case, the issue does not arise in the
affirmative action context, because most Asian groups do not require race-based preferences in
order to gain admissions to elite universities in large numbers, though it may well be that under
a diversity calculus like the University of Michigan Law School's, Asian applicants are
benefiting. However, the category "Asian" paints with an exceptionally broad brush, obscuring
the fact that certain Asian groups, such as Filipinos and Cambodians, may not be succeeding at
the same rate as other students of Asian descent.
49. See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CAL. L. REv. 277 (2007) (arguing
that narrow tailoring is context-dependent and that individualized consideration is inappropriate
in the primary school assignment context); James E. Ryan, Voluntary Integration: Asking the
Right Questions, 67 OHIo ST. L.J. 327 (2006) (arguing that it would be inappropriate for the
Court to apply an individualized consideration requirement in the school assignment cases
because the goal in the primary school context is diversity in itself, without the overlay of merit-
based competition).
50. I discuss the significance of group power as it relates to the definition of Latino in the
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Of course, the acceptable use of race may legitimately vary from context to context.
But it is important to be aware that one of the costs of elevating individualized
consideration as the model of the proper state use of race has been the creation of a
misplaced presumption against mechanical rules-a problem particularly evident in
Parents Involved. The fact that we use mechanical groupings that cohere as the result
of individual self-identification and not state-initiated sorting in contexts such as the
voting rights arena should give us greater confidence that the use of broad and
mechanical groupings can succeed. 51 Mechanical rules have their place and should not
be rejected on the dubious grounds that their use demeans the individual.
CONCLUSION: DIVERSITY AS (WELCOME) DISTRACTION
Most Cuban Americans and island-born Puerto Ricans would be aghast if told of
the assumptions made by the University of Michigan Law School admissions officer
with which I began this Article. Under any common sense definition of the general
term Hispanic, Cuban Americans and island-born Puerto Ricans unquestionably
qualify. What is it about Cubans, in particular, that would lead someone to the opposite
conclusion? The fact that they are overwhelmingly Republican? That they are a
political force to be reckoned with in South Florida and therefore in national politics?
That they have succeeded economically as a group? That many Cuban Americans are
white? Is "Latino" the opposite of each of these things?
Despite the surface absurdity of the Cuban American exclusion, a logical basis for
the distinctions does exist. Michigan justified its affirmative action policy as a means
of achieving diversity with "special reference to the inclusion of students from groups
which have been historically discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispanics
and Native Americans, who without this commitment might not be represented in our
student body in meaningful numbers. 52 A strong case can be made that it has been
mainland Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans whose histories in the United States
have been the most marked by discrimination and disadvantage, thus leading to their
under-representation in elite law schools and other similar institutions. The University
of Michigan Law School admissions officers may well have been trying to identify the
subset of Hispanics particularly likely to be underrepresented, either in their applicant
pool, or in society at large, and to ensure that those groups were included. Perhaps a
mechanical rule that assigned points to all applicants who were Latino would have
failed to reach these groups, thus re-enforcing the already advantaged state of Latinos
such as Cuban Americans, island Puerto Ricans, and others.
As an empirical matter, it is by no means clear that a mechanical system could not
be structured to address this concern. Perhaps the twenty points assigned by the
process at issue in Gratz were meant to ensure that even the least-represented Latinos
would be reached. Efforts to adjust point totals to reach the most disadvantaged
Latinos may result in the over-inclusion of minorities who have suffered no
discrimination or disadvantage, or those who are undeserving of having the limitations
of their grades, test scores, and other attributes offset by a race-based preference. But
voting rights context elsewhere. See Rodrfguez, From Litigation, Legislation, supra note 25.
51. For a more extended discussion of this point with a view to the evolution of the Court's
standards for determining whether section five of the Voting Rights Act has been violated, see
id.
52. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003) (emphasis added).
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this overinclusiveness is a different problem from the failure to reach truly
disadvantaged minorities and is not itself a reason to disfavor mechanical policies as a
means of addressing subordination concerns.
53
But, more to the point, decision making that draws these sorts of distinctions among
minority applicants does not sit well within the terms of equal protection doctrine, even
after Grutter. The justification the school advanced for its affirmative action policy and
that the Court ultimately accepted as compelling was the pursuit of diversity. The
Court repeatedly expressed strong support for a broad and inclusive definition of
diversity and reiterated Justice Powell's rejection of "reducing the historic deficit of
traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools" as an unlawful interest in racial
balancing. 54 In other words, the evolution of equal protection doctrine has made it
necessary to define the Hispanic category broadly.
As countless commentators have noted, however, and as the admissions officers'
parsing of the term Hispanic suggests, Michigan Law School did appear to have been
bootstrapping an antidiscrimination rationale into its diversity justification. The law
school was arguably circumventing the Court's very clear determinations in City of
Richmond v. JA. Croson, Co. 55and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia 56 that race-
conscious efforts to remedy past discrimination are only justified to redress
discrimination committed by the decision maker in question-a justification
unavailable as a legal matter to the University of Michigan Law School. Indeed, its
particular admissions track record included no evidence of past discrimination against
mainland Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans.57 By ignoring the evidence of Latino
parsing, the Court may have been legitimizing this reformulation of the discarded
societal discrimination rationale for affirmative action into a diversity framework.58
53. Overinclusiveness is a problem generally with mechanical rules; applicants can claim
membership in a group without having to prove their bona fides. But leaving aside the fact that
essays, too, can be manipulated to present a dishonest but appealing minority profile, I
ultimately prefer to tolerate overinclusion in exchange for restraining the state from determining
who constitutes a deserving minority qua minority.
54. Id. at 323.
55. 488 U.S. 469,485-86 (1989) (striking down set-aside program for minority contractors
adopted by city of Richmond, Virginia, on the ground that it did not address historical
discrimination against the beneficiaries of the program by the city).
56. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (striking down scheme administered by Department of
Transportation to give preference to minorities when awarding contracting and subcontracting
jobs).
57. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. But cf Adarand, 515 U.S. at 200 (requiring showing that
the state institution utilizing affirmative action must itself have discriminated against preferred
group in order for remedying past discrimination to qualify as a compelling state interest that
justifies a narrowly tailored affirmative action plan).
58. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1470, 1538-44 (2004)
(arguing that Grutter expands the concept of diversity by embracing antisubordination values
despite deploying anticlassification discourse, such that the Court appears to be allowing racial
allocation of opportunities when the state is looking to inhibit or break down caste relations, so
long as the state acts in a way that will not unduly exacerbate race consciousness or resentment
of majority group members).
20081 1419
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
But if that is what the Court accomplished, the reformulation remains
uncomfortable and is hardly a model schools will be able to follow going forward.
Indeed, had the admissions policy itself expressed a particular interest in the diversity
contributed by Mexican Americans, rather than Hispanics generally, it would likely
have been more difficult for the school to defend its diversity claims. The
bootstrapping would have been too obvious, and the diversity premise would have
been undermined.
One way to understand these tensions is to acknowledge that they demonstrate how
the rise of the diversity interest as the justification for affirmative action has led us
astray. We have moved away from an honest approach to what should be the animating
purposes of a civil rights agenda: combating discrimination and eliminating its effects.
We might not feel the imperative to create a broad Hispanic category in the admissions
system if we remained clear-eyed about our anti-discrimination goals.
59
But not only has the Court made it impossible for institutions like the University of
Michigan to engage in this sort of broad-based social policy without some kind of
cover, the evolution of the diversity justification and the corresponding rise of broad-
based racial categories is itself a positive development. Taking the diversity rationale
seriously is actually in the long-term interests of Latinos, and it serves the broader
social interest of reducing the salience of race in our society. Even if the Court were to
return to permitting state actors to remedy subordination generally through race
conscious policies, diversity should continue to be pursued and regarded as
compelling.
The benefit of this move is apparent for Latinos for several reasons. First and
foremost, it is important to have a publicly articulated and even state-sanctioned
conception of Latino that is not tied exclusively to the experience of discrimination and
disadvantage. Without discounting the history and continuation of under-representation
experienced by Latinos of many different types, it is crucial to augment that conception
of Latino with affirmative statements of value that stem not only from the unique
contributions the population has made to the history and dynamism of the United
States, but also from the diversity of the population itself. Indeed, race discourse in
general has benefited from a move toward the positive and away from efforts to link
59. A similar point can be made in the voting rights context, in which the race-
consciousness of voting rights litigation brings groups, such as Cuban Americans, who have
never been subject to the kind of systematic intimidation, violence, and exclusion from voting
experienced by southern blacks and Mexican Americans in Texas and other parts of the
Southwest, under the protection of the Voting Rights Act. For an articulation of how the voting
fights claims of some advocates have become unmoored from these foundations, see Samuel
Issacharoff, Groups and the Right to Vote, 44 EMORY L.J. 869, 872 (1995) ("[T]he current
proliferation of group claims in the voting rights arena stems from a profound disorientation
from the crucial factors that justify . . . the 'affirmative' reliance on racial or ethnic
classifications. The rationale of Carolene Products... suggests that a claim for judicial reform
of the political process requires a showing both of group disadvantage and of the group's
historic inability to redress that disadvantage .... Whatever the merits of the 'rainbow
coalition' as a matter of political program, not all members of the coalition share these features;
not all are entitled to the special solicitude for which they clamor.") (emphasis in original). For
my own assessment of these matters, see Rodriguez, From Litigation, Legislation, supra note
25.
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the majority culture to a history of subordination and the minority culture to the status
of victim.
60
Second, the diversity rationale articulated in Grutter-its focus on making the paths
to participation and leadership open to socially salient groups-is an advance over the
educational benefits version of diversity developed by Justice Powell in Bakke,
because it is a claim for equal ownership of our social and political life, and not just a
claim about the exchange of ideas in the rarified setting of the classroom. Crucially for
Latinos, the expansion of the diversity rationale enables equal ownership and
representation claims to be made not just by populations whose history of exclusion is
deeply entrenched in American history, but also by populations whose presence is
socially salient but is largely the result of post-civil rights era immigration-claims I
believe Latinos are justified in making but whose complete defense is beyond the
scope of this Article.6' Indeed, the Latino population in the United States today is
substantially the product of post-1965 immigration. In 1966, 8.5 million Hispanics
lived in the United States, compared to 44.7 million Latinos in 2006-a development
in which immigration played a major factor.62 The Latino population's claim to
representation and solicitude, therefore, must stem from a source other than a claim for
redress of past wrongs.
Finally, Hispanic or Latino is descriptive of an associational dynamic in the
contemporary United States.63 Latino is a socially material category, constructed by
our civil rights history, the nature of post-1965 immigration, the academy, and the
media, both English and Spanish-language. Our political and social discourses
constantly cycle back to the terms Latino and Hispanic, with good reason. Not only is a
more specific definition of Latino difficult to administer and likely to result in
exclusions that create grievances and hence competition across Latino subgroups, but
life in the United States tends to have an amalgamating effect for Latinos, particularly
as the immigrant generation gives way to second and third generations, such that the
wider society comes to recognize Latinos as Latinos.
64
60. For those who eschew race consciousness altogether, the inability to pinpoint past
discrimination against a particular group by a particular institution should mean an end to race
consciousness. But this conception of race in American life ignores that racial and ethnic
differences will continue to be salient, and that racial groupings simply will not disappear,
because human societies are constituted in part by subgroups. The nature and perhaps salience
of race will change over time and across generations, particularly when it comes to the racial or
ethnic identity of the descendants of immigrants, but the notion that racial and related
differences will disappear seems blinkered.
61. I have developed this point more fully elsewhere. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language
Diversity in the Workplace, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1689, 1747-50 (2006).
62. See Pew Hispanic Center, Fact Sheet, From 200 Million to 300 Million: The Numbers
Behind Population Growth, available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/25/pdf.
63. As I note above, I explore the reasons why in more detail elsewhere. See supra note 25
and accompanying text.
64. Cf. ROGER WALDINGER, BETWEEN HERE AND THERE: How ATTACHED ARE LATINO
IMMIGRANTS TO THEIR NATIVE COUNTRY? i (2007), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/80.pdf (noting that attachment to home country is less for
Latinos who have spent more time in the United States or who arrived as children, and that most
Latinos in the United States see their future as inside the United States, rather than their
countries of origin). After the third generation, when connection to the culture of origin and the
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In the end, because the Latino category exists largely as a function of the race-based
way in which American legal and political culture frame debates over disadvantage
and difference, it is important to define the category broadly, in order to prevent the
meaning of the category from becoming fixed. This broad definition will help to
destabilize the concept of race over the long-haul-not so that it disappears, but so that
we can approach the condition of a pluralistic equality where race matters but does not
map onto status. Nothing about having broadly defined racial categories precludes
addressing socioeconomic or class-oriented concerns within the Latino community; the
diversity interest and a broad conceptualization of race's contribution to that interest
does not require discounting other forms of difference that challenge the coherence of
racial categories along the economic dimension.
But as I hope my discussion of individualized versus mechanical decision making
has made clear, when the state invokes broad-based racial categories like Latino, it is
vital that it refrain from giving them content, permitting the definition of the groups to
be fluid and driven by those who seek to identify and include themselves within the
groups' parameters. In the context of affirmative action, this imperative requires the
use of mechanical, broad-based methods of ensuring inclusion in political and social
institutions. Such approaches may seem too race-conscious, over-inclusive, and
increasingly divorced from the original, specific aims of the civil rights agenda. But
they are, in fact, the best means of keeping the government's role in defining and using
race limited, even as we give the government the tools to promote inclusion and
integration. And, in both the affirmative action context and in general, mechanical and
broad-based rules for who counts as Latino are the best hope for respecting the fluid
and evolving nature of the Latino population while simultaneously ensuring that this
increasingly important segment of the population is part of the governing structure of
society.
Spanish language is likely to be non-existent, or attenuated at best, Latino identity arguably
becomes less complex and more traditionally American, in that non-white Latinos may persist
in being defined as such, whereas white Latinos may have assimilated entirely into a white
American majority. For a discussion of the linguistic assimilation of Latinos across three
generations that results in the loss of Spanish-speaking ability by the third generation, see
RICHARD ALBA & VICTOR NEE, REMAKING THE AMERICAN MAINSTREAM: ASSIMILATION AND
CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION 219 (2003).
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